1 Introduction

This paper deals mainly with the power of police to arrest a person under s.99 of the *Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002* (LEPRA).

It also touches on the common law power to arrest for breach of the peace, the power of police to arrest for breach of bail under s.77 of the *Bail Act 2013*, and the citizen's arrest power under LEPRA s.100.

2 Power to arrest for an offence: LEPRA s.99

Section 99 of LEPRA confers power on a police officer to arrest a person without warrant on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence.

The section was amended by the *Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest without Warrant) Act 2013*, with effect from 16 December 2013.

It now provides:

(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:

(a) the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence, and

(b) the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more of the following reasons:

(i) to stop the person committing or repeating the offence or committing another offence,

(ii) to stop the person fleeing from a police officer or from the location of the offence,

(iii) to enable inquiries to be made to establish the person’s identity if it cannot be readily established or if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that identity information provided is false,

(iv) to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence,

(v) to obtain property in the possession of the person that is connected with the offence,

(vi) to preserve evidence of the offence or prevent the fabrication of evidence,

(vii) to prevent the harassment of, or interference with, any person who may give evidence in relation to the offence,
(viii) to protect the safety or welfare of any person (including the
person arrested),
(ix) because of the nature and seriousness of the offence.

(2) A police officer may also arrest a person without a warrant if directed to do so by
another police officer. The other police officer is not to give such a direction unless the
other officer may lawfully arrest the person without a warrant.

(3) A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is
reasonably practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with
according to law.

Note: The police officer may discontinue the arrest at any time and without taking the
arrested person before an authorised officer—see section 105.

(4) A person who has been lawfully arrested under this section may be detained by any
police officer under Part 9 for the purpose of investigating whether the person committed
the offence for which the person has been arrested and for any other purpose authorised
by that Part.

(5) This section does not authorise a person to be arrested for an offence for which the
person has already been tried.

(6) For the purposes of this section, property is connected with an offence if it is
connected with the offence within the meaning of Part 5.

3 Summary of 2013 amendments to s.99

As mentioned above, s.99 was amended with effect from 16 December 2013.

The main amendment was to replace the “arrest as a last resort” provision (formerly s99.(3)) with a
new s99.(1)(b). The effect of this is discussed in Part 7 of this paper.

The amended s.99 also makes it clear that a police officer may arrest a person upon reasonable
suspicion of having committed any offence, not just a serious indictable offence (s.99(1)(a)).

The amended s.99 also allows a police officer to arrest if directed to do so by another officer, but
only if the officer giving the direction is lawfully entitled to arrest the person without warrant
(s.99(2)).

Unlike the section in its previous form, the amended s.99 does not contain any reference to an
arrest “for the purpose of commencing proceedings”. However, for reasons explained in Part 6 of
this paper, an arrest under s.99 is still unlawful if it is not for the purpose of commencing
proceedings.

Section 105 was also amended, with the addition of a new subs(3). This provides that a police
officer may discontinue an arrest despite any obligation to take the arrested person before an
authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.

4 Criteria for a lawful arrest under s.99

There are at least four (arguably five) criteria for a lawful arrest under s99:

(a) Reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed an offence;
(b) Arrest must be for the purpose of commencing proceedings;
(c) Arresting officer must be “satisfied that arrest is reasonably necessary” for one
of more of the purposes listed in s99(1)(b);
(d) Arresting officer must provide the information set out in LEPRA Part 15 unless it is not reasonably practicable; and

(e) Any force used must be reasonable (opinions differ as to whether excessive force makes the arrest unlawful *per se*; however, excessive force would almost certainly take an officer outside the lawful execution of his or her duty).

5 Reasonable suspicion

“Reasonable suspicion” is now a relatively well-understood concept and will not be discussed in detail in this document.

A helpful formulation of “reasonable suspicion” appears in Smart AJ’s judgment in *R v Rondo* [2001] NSWCCA 540, at para 53. Although *Rondo* applies to the power to stop and search, its principles have more general application. In summary:

(a) A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility.

(b) Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. It may be based on hearsay or material which may be inadmissible in evidence, but the material must have some probative value.

(c) Regard must be had to the information in the mind of the police officer at the time of stopping the person or making the arrest. The question is then whether that information afforded (objectively) reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the officer formed.

6 Arrest must be for purpose of commencing proceedings

An arrest for an offence *must be for the purpose of taking proceedings in relation to the offence*, and not for some extraneous purpose such as questioning. This is a common law principle that has not been displaced by LEPRA.

6.1 Common law pre-LEPRA

In *Williams v R* (1986) 161 CLR 278, the High Court dealt with a Tasmanian legislative provision that required a person taken into custody for an offence to be taken before a justice without delay. The High Court confirmed that an arrest for an offence must be for the purpose of commencing proceedings, and that there is no power to detain a person merely for the purpose of investigation or questioning. Further, a statute which authorises the detention of a person must be strictly construed, because of the high value the law places on personal liberty.

Before the enactment of LEPRA, the power to arrest without warrant in NSW was set out in s352 of the *Crimes Act*. Like the current s.99 of LEPRA, it essentially empowered a police officer to arrest a person in the act of, or having just committed, or on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. It also imposed a requirement to take the person before an authorised Justice to be dealt with according to law.

In *Bales v Parmeter* (1935) SR (NSW) 182, Jordan CJ said:

“The statute, like the common law, authorises him only to take the person so arrested before a justice to be dealt with according to law, and to do so without delay and by the most reasonably direct route: *Clarke v Bailey* (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 303.’

and:

“... a police officer has no more authority to restrain the liberty of a suspected person for the purpose, not of taking him before a magistrate, but of interrogating him, than he has
of restraining the liberty of a person who may be supposed to be capable of supplying information as a witness."

These passages were cited with approval by Mason and Brennan JJ in *Williams*, at 293.

In *R v Dungay* [2001] NSWCCA 443, police decided to arrest the appellant so that he could be taken to the police station and asked questions so as to assist the police in their investigations. Police made no mention in evidence of the appellant being arrested so that he could be taken before a magistrate. Although it was found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect that the appellant had committed an offence, the arrest was held to be unlawful because it was solely for investigative purposes.

In *Zaravinos v State of New South Wales* [2004] NSWCA 320, the plaintiff recovered damages for wrongful arrest. He was asked to come to the police station for an interview. He attended voluntarily and was immediately arrested. As in *Dungay*, there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had committed an offence. However, the arrest was held to be unlawful because it was done for an extraneous purpose (that is, investigation and questioning), and also because it was done in a "high-handed" manner without properly considering an alternative such as a summons.

### 6.2 Effect of LEPRA Part 9

The effect of the High Court decision in *Williams* was somewhat modified by the enactment of Part 9 of LEPRA (formerly Part 10A of the *Crimes Act*), which empowers police to detain a person for a limited period after arrest in order to investigate the alleged offence.

However, s113(1)(a) makes it clear that the power conferred by Part 9 applies only if the person has first been lawfully arrested. *There is still no power to arrest merely for the purpose of questioning, investigation, or ascertaining identity.*

It is worth noting that the "detention after arrest" provisions commenced in 1998 and were thus in force in 1999 when the arrests in both *Dungay* and *Zaravinos* took place.

### 6.3 Case law on LEPRA s.99 in its previous form

The following cases dealt with s.99 of LEPRA as it was before the 2013 amendments. In *McClean* and *Dowse* it was held that an arrest under s.99 must be for the purpose of commencing criminal proceedings. The decision in *Williams* also supports this proposition.

*R v McClean* [2008] NSWLC 11

This is a decision of Magistrate Heilpern in the Local Court. As well as holding that arrest or detention for the purpose of questioning is unlawful, it also deals with the former s.99(3) and arrest as a last resort.

The defendant was approached by police who were making inquiries into a suspected break and enter. She provided her name and produced her driving licence on request, and her licence details were entered in one of the officers’ notebooks.

After some further conversation, she was told that she was suspected of trying to break into someone’s unit, and, “At this point you have to wait here until we make further inquiries about what has happened. We will get some details from you and carry out some checks. Failure to comply and you may be committing an offence.”

The defendant said, “We don’t have to stay here”. Police again told her she was required to stay. She repeated that she didn’t have to stay, and attempted to leave. Police physically restrained her and a struggle ensued. She was eventually handcuffed and told she was under arrest for assault.

The defendant was charged with assaulting and resisting police in the execution of their duty. She successfully argued that the police were not acting lawfully in the execution of their duty.

Although the police did not use the word “arrest” when refusing to allow the defendant to leave, it was agreed by both prosecution and defence that she was in fact placed under arrest. The defendant submitted the arrest was unlawful, firstly because it was for the purpose of investigation.
and not for the purpose of commencing proceedings for an offence. Secondly, even if it was for the purpose of commencing proceedings, there was nothing in s.99(3) that justified the use of arrest.

The prosecution submitted that it was lawful to arrest the defendant because she was reasonably suspected of having committed an offence, and that once she was under arrest the police had the power to detain her to confirm her identity. They submitted that the arrest was justified under s.99(3)(a), for the purpose of ensuring that her identity could be confirmed so she could be brought before a court.

The Magistrate rejected the prosecution submissions, and held that the arrest was unlawful because it was carried out for the improper purpose of investigation. His Honour also found the arrest unlawful on the separate basis that it was not justified under s.99(3)(a). He noted that the police had the defendant’s name, address and licence details, and there was no evidence that there was anything suspicious about these details.

His Honour said, at paras 25-26:

"It is my view of s.99 of LEPRA that subsection (2) states a general power, and then subsection (3) qualifies that power. The words “must not arrest” in subsection (3) are an unambiguous representation of parliamentary intent creating preconditions for a lawful arrest. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer statement of parliamentary intent. Investigation is not one of these preconditions.

It is arguable that subsection (3) limits those preconditions to circumstances of arrest by the words “for the purpose of taking proceedings”. Thus, the argument goes, police need only have a reasonable suspicion to arrest, and then can detain for the purposes of investigation without concern for s99.(3). Sections 109 to 114 of LEPRA do provide powers for detention after arrest for the purposes of investigation, however it was not submitted by the prosecution that these sections were relied upon. It is clear that those sections do not confer any power to detain a person who has not been lawfully arrested – see s. 113(1)(a) of LEPRA. Further, such an interpretation would represent such a significant departure from the common law prohibition regarding arrest for investigation that it could not be said to represent a codification of the common law."

At para 31:

"The courts and the parliament have spoken loudly, clearly and repeatedly – it is not enough to arrest a person simply because there is a reasonable suspicion that they have committed an offence. Arrest will be unlawful unless it is necessary to achieve one of the purposes set out in s99(3). It is not one of those purposes that further investigation needs to take place. Arrest is a last resort."

At para 33:

"[I]n my view if the initial arrest was for the purpose of investigation, and that was unlawful, it does not matter that the purpose of the detention then changed to something else – McHugh J makes this clear in Coleman v Power. The poisoned root affects the entire tree."

**Williams v DPP [2011] NSWSC 1085**

In Williams v DPP (discussed in Part 7.2 of this document), Harrison AsJ held that the arrest of the appellant was unlawful because police had not complied with what was then s.99(3).

The DPP submitted that an arrest under s.99 need not always be for the purpose of commencing criminal proceedings; therefore the power is not always constrained by subs(3) (which provided that “police must not arrest a person for the purpose of commencing criminal proceedings unless…”). Her Honour did not accept this submission (see paras 20-23); however, she did not need to decide on this point, as the DPP had conceded that the arrest in this case was carried out with the intention of commencing proceedings.

**Dowse v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 337**

The plaintiff, who had fallen and injured himself while being chased by police, sued the state in negligence and trespass to the person. The Court of Appeal held that his claims should be
dismissed because, at the relevant time, there had been no trespass to the person and the police did not owe him a duty of care.

An issue also arose in the appeal about the power of arrest. Basten JA (with whom McColl JA and Hoeben JA agreed) said (at 26):

[26] “While it is true, as Lord Hope explained in O’Hara, that there are two elements to be satisfied for a warrantless arrest to be valid, namely an honestly held suspicion in the mind of the arresting officer and information in the mind of the arresting officer which when objectively assessed provides reasonable grounds for the suspicion, these are not abstract and independent elements. They justify a deprivation of liberty which in turn is part of an ongoing process by which the person arrested must be taken before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law: Law Enforcement Act, s 99(4). In other words, the arrest is a first step in the process by which the person is to be made answerable for the offence, the commission of which the officer suspects. The same underlying purpose is to be found in s 99(3) which limits the circumstances in which an officer may arrest a person “for the purpose of taking proceedings for an offence against the person”; it thus assumes that such a purpose must underlie a valid arrest.”

[27] “In other words, an arrest will not be valid merely because the officer believes that an offence has been committed, in circumstances where the officer has no intention of charging the person or having the person charged with that offence.”

6.4 Effect of 2013 amendments to s.99

Although the amended s.99 no longer refers to an arrest “for the purpose of commencing proceedings”, it is suggested that the above authorities are still good law, and that s.99 does not justify an arrest for a purpose other than commencing proceedings.

The new subs.99(3) (formerly s.99(4)) requires the person under arrest to be brought before an authorised officer (this is defined in s.3 of LEPRA and essentially means a magistrate, registrar or bail justice) as soon as practicable. It is suggested that subs. 99(3) is intended to reflect the common law and to make it clear that the purpose of an arrest is to commence proceedings.

The predecessor to s.99 was Crimes Act s.352, which did not spell out that an arrest must be for the purpose of commencing proceedings, but did refer to taking the person before an authorised justice to be dealt with according to law. In cases such as Dungay and Zaravinos, which dealt with s.352, the courts were clear that there was no power to arrest for the purpose of investigation.

Even the previous version of s.99 did not explicitly say that an arrest must be for the purpose of commencing proceedings. The former s.99(3) provided that “a police officer must not arrest a person for the purpose of commencing proceedings unless ...”. It is suggested that the removal of the words “for the purpose of commencing proceedings” is of no consequence.

There is no evidence that Parliament intended to oust the common law when enacting or amending LEPRA. Nothing in the second reading speech to the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest without Warrant) Bill 2013 suggested an intention to change the common law position in this regard:

In accordance with the “principle of legality” enunciated by the High Court in Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, any intention by the legislature to interfere with fundamental rights “must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language”.

6.5 Case law since 2013 amendments

R v Bennett (2015) NSWDC 1 was a judgment of Mahony DCJ on an appeal against a Local Court conviction for assault police in execution of duty. The alleged offence was committed on 28 January 2014, after the commencement of the 2013 amendment to LEPRA s.99. Although the amendments were not explicitly discussed, it was accepted that arrest for the purpose of investigation or questioning is unlawful.
In this case the police officer gave evidence that he believed the appellant had committed an offence of offensive conduct, but that he stopped him “for a chat” and at that stage was not intending to commence proceedings. His Honour found this to be an unlawful arrest and excluded evidence of the alleged assault under s.138 of the Evidence Act. Alternatively, his Honour would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the police officer was not acting lawfully in the execution of his duty.

The prosecution also relied on the case of DPP v Gribble [2004] NSWSC 926, submitting that the officer’s actions did not constitute an arrest but that the officer was legitimately trying to pull the appellant off the roadway for his own safety. However, his Honour held that this was not a Gribble-type situation, as there was no evidence that the appellant was in any danger; he was merely crossing the road and there was no traffic at the time.

7 Arrest as a last resort

7.1 Common law pre-LEPRA

There is a long line of pre-LEPRA authority, including Fleet v District Court of NSW [1999] NSWCA 363 and DPP v Carr (2002) 127 A Crim R 151, to the effect that arrest is a last resort and should not be used for minor offences where the defendant’s name and address are known and a summons would suffice.

Carr involved a man who was arrested for offensive language after swearing at police. While the arrest was technically lawful, it was held to be improper because it was inappropriate in the circumstances. Mr Carr was accused of a minor summary offence, the police knew his name and address, and there was no reason to believe that a summons would not be effective in bringing him to court.

Smart AJ said (at 159):

“This court in its appellate and trial divisions has been emphasising for many years that it is inappropriate for powers of arrest to be used for minor offences where the defendant’s name and address are known, there is no risk of him departing and there no reason to believe that a summons will not be effective. Arrest is an additional punishment involving deprivation of freedom and frequently ignominy and fear. The consequences of the employment of the power of arrest unnecessarily and inappropriately and instead of issuing a summons are often anger on the part of the person arrested and an escalation of the situation leading to the person resisting arrest and assaulting police. The pattern in this case is all too familiar. It is time that the statements of this court were heeded.”

7.2 Case law on LEPRA subs.99(3) in its previous form

Prior to the 2013 amendments, subs.99(3) of LEPRA provided that “A police officer must not arrest a person for the purpose of commencing proceedings for an offence unless he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that arrest is necessary” for one of the purposes listed in subs.99(3).

This was said to give a statutory basis to the principle of arrest as a last resort. In the LEPRA Second Reading Speech (NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard, 17 September 2002), the then Attorney-General said:

“Part 8 of the Bill substantially re-enacts arrest provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 and codifies the common law. The provisions of Part 8 reflect that is a measure that it is to be exercised only when necessary. An arrest should only be used as a last resort as it is the strongest measure that may be taken to secure an accused person’s attendance at court.”
Williams v DPP [2011] NSWSC 1085

In Williams v DPP [2011] NSWSC 1085, Harrison AsJ confirmed that the power to arrest in subs(2) is subject to subs(3).

Police attended a local Masonic hall, where a community function was taking place, to arrest the appellant's brother Joel for a shoplifting offence allegedly committed three weeks earlier. The appellant and his mother both attempted to interfere with the arrest and were charged with hindering police in the execution of their duty. It was conceded that they were hindering; the issue was whether the police were acting lawfully in the execution of their duty.

There was no evidence that the police, when they arrested Joel, were concerned about any of the matters listed in s.99(3)(a)-(f).

At first instance, the magistrate held the arrest was lawful because it complied with s.99(2), that is, the police officer suspected on reasonable grounds that Joel had committed an offence. Despite the submissions put to him by the defence, the magistrate apparently ignored subs(3).

The appellant and his mother were both found guilty of hindering police and appealed to the Supreme Court on a point of law.

On appeal, the conviction was set aside. Her Honour held that the arrest was unlawful as it did not comply with s.99(3).


This was a civil case in which the plaintiff was awarded damages for wrongful arrest.

The plaintiff was arrested, along with three others, as part of a police operation in relation to the supply of cocaine. There was evidence from lawfully-intercepted telephone conversations and SMS messages to suggest that the plaintiff was buying cocaine from a supplier, apparently to on-supply to others.

When arrested, the plaintiff nominated her drug supplier and told police that she would be prepared to co-operate in their investigation. She was taken to the police station, where she was interviewed and provided an exculpatory statement regarding her apparent supply of cocaine. After agreeing to give a statement against her supplier, she was released without charge.

It was conceded that s.99(2) of LEPRA was satisfied, as the police officers suspected on reasonable grounds that the plaintiff had committed an offence. However, the plaintiff submitted that the arresting officers were merely ordered to arrest her, and did not have any information specific to her circumstances that would have allowed them to form a reasonable suspicion that arrest was necessary for one of the purposes listed in s.99(3).

The defendant submitted that the arresting police officers had considered s.99(3) at the time of her arrest. The arresting officers gave evidence that, as the plaintiff was part of a group of apparently connected drug suppliers, if she was not arrested at the same time as the others, there was a risk that she could flee the jurisdiction, that evidence could be lost and that offences could continue.

Elkaim DCJ was not satisfied that the arrest was justified by s.99(3). He summarised his reasons as follows (at para 211):

“(a) I do not accept that the arresting officers gave individual consideration to the justification for the arrest against the background of [written operational orders] and the plain direction from [a senior officer]. …

(b) There was no consideration of matters personal to the plaintiff as opposed to a general conclusion to this effect: if she has been supplying drugs then there must be a risk of flight, reoffending or destruction of evidence.

(c) In any event there were not reasonable grounds to suspect any of the purposes in Section 99(3) needed to be achieved.”

His Honour said (at para 202):

"[T]here must be, in my view, a deliberate addressing of the purposes in Section 99(3) by the police officer concerning the particular person to be arrested. This is not to say that a
‘ticking off of a checklist’ exercise must be undertaken but rather that the facts personal to the person to be arrested must be considered”.

The plaintiff also submitted that her arrest was for a collateral purpose, namely to obtain evidence against her supplier. However, His Honour held (at para 213):

“Although there is a strong flavour of the arrest being made for the purpose of obtaining evidence against Mr B I do not think there is enough evidence to make a positive finding to this effect.”

Leave to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeal was refused on the grounds that the application demonstrated no question of law that warranted consideration by the Court: State of New South Wales v Hage-Ali [2011] NSWCA 31.

R v McClean [2008] NSWLC 11

See discussion at Part 6.2 above.

Tilse v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWDC 265

This was a civil action for the tort of false imprisonment. On 1 May 2011, Ms Tilse presented herself at Grafton Police Station, having been told that police wanted to speak to her about an alleged assault committed at a pub a few days earlier. She was immediately placed under arrest and was in custody for several hours before being charged and released on bail.

The police relied on s.99(3)(d), that arrest was necessary to prevent harassment of or interference with potential witnesses. Specifically it was submitted that it was necessary to arrest her so that appropriate bail conditions could be imposed.

Ms Tilse submitted that this objective could have been achieved by applying for an AVO without the necessity to impose bail conditions. In the alternative, it was submitted that bail conditions could have been imposed without arresting her. She relied on s.15(1) of the old Bail Act 1978, which provided “An accused person may be granted or refused bail in accordance with this Act, notwithstanding that the person is not in custody.”

Nielson DCJ was of the view that an AVO application would not have been sufficient to protect the witnesses in this particular case. This was partly because the witnesses were not in a domestic relationship with the plaintiff, and in practice it is more difficult to obtain an APVO (particularly a provisional order) than an ADVO (see paras 129-134).

His Honour agreed with the plaintiff’s submission that bail could be granted to a person who is not in custody, with the proviso that the accused must be “present at police station” (Bail Act 1978 s.17). In the course of his reasons, His Honour revised the view he had expressed in his earlier decision of Carey v State of New South Wales [2013] NSWDC 213, in which he said, obiter, “that the only power the police had to grant bail is if a person had been arrested” (see paras 138-152).

Despite his finding that bail conditions could have been imposed without arresting the plaintiff, his Honour concluded that arrest was necessary in the particular circumstances of the case (see paras 153-160). Although Ms Tilse had voluntarily presented herself to the police station, the station was understaffed and police were busy dealing with other persons in custody and were not able to deal with her straight away. “There was nothing…to suggest that the plaintiff might meekly wait around to be dealt with in due course by the police.” (at para 160).

Ultimately, the plaintiff recovered some damages because his Honour found that, although the arrest was lawful, she was held in custody for an excessively long period.

State of New South Wales v Robinson [2016] NSWCA 334

Mr Robinson alleged that he had been wrongly arrested on 13 October 2013 because the arresting police officer did not suspect on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to arrest him for any of the purposes specified in the former s.99(3). The only “purpose” in issue in the proceedings was para (b) of subs (3), namely, “to prevent a repetition or continuation of [an] offence”.

The primary judge in the District Court found for the Plaintiff. However, the State of NSW successfully appealed on all grounds (including that the primary judge had applied the wrong test).
In a joint judgment, Beazley P, Payne JA and Sackville AJA held that “necessary” in the context of the former s.99(3) means “needed to be done” or “required” in the sense of “requisite”, or something “that cannot be dispensed with” (at paras 37-43).

For the arrest to be lawful, the police officer must have honestly suspected that the arrest was necessary for one of the purposes set out in s 99(3), and this must have been based on objectively reasonable grounds. The State did not need to establish that it was actually necessary to arrest the plaintiff (paras 31-35).

In this case the court found that the arresting officer did hold the relevant suspicion, on reasonable grounds. At the time of the arrest, the police officer had cause to believe that the Plaintiff had a record of violence and a “strong animus” against the victim, that he had stalked her and threatened to bomb her workplace, and that he had breached a court order within hours of it being made.

For further examples of civil cases that apply the former s.99(3), see Hamilton v State of NSW (No 13) [2016] NSWSC 1311 (police complied with s.99(3), but did not comply with Part 15 and used excessive force), Smith v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWDC 55 (this involved an arrest for an alleged domestic violence offence; arrest unlawful as it was done for administrative convenience of police and not for a purpose listed in s.99(3)), and Scott-Irving v New South Wales (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1040 (plaintiff’s claim dismissed as the arrest complied with s.99).

7.3 Effect of 2013 amendments to s.99

Is arrest still a last resort?

From the second reading speech to the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest without Warrant) Bill 2013, it is apparent that Parliament intended to make it easier for police officers to arrest suspects. This is reflected in the new s.99(1)(b), which provides more grounds to arrest than the old s.99(3). There has also been a change of language from “must not arrest unless” to “may arrest if”.

However, it is submitted that arrest is still a last resort. To depart from this long-held common law principle, more explicit language would have been required. Again, as the High Court held in Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427:

“The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language.”

In DPP (NSW) v Mathews-Hunter [2014] NSWSC 843, Fullerton J was of the view that arrest is a last resort under both the new s.99(1)(b) and s.100. Although the case concerned s.100 (the citizen’s arrest power), and her Honour’s comments on s.99(1)(b) are obiter, these comments are nevertheless persuasive. For a discussion of this case, see Part 10 of this paper.

Objective or subjective test?

The test that existed in the former s99(3), which had both an objective and a subjective element, has been changed.

Instead of requiring the police officer to “suspect on reasonable grounds that arrest is necessary...”, s99(1)(b) now allows a police officer to arrest if “the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary...”.

On one view, this new test is wholly subjective: it simply requires the police officer to be satisfied in his or her own mind that arrest is reasonably necessary.

An alternative view is that the presence of the word “reasonably” before “necessary” implies that the police officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that arrest is necessary. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that nowhere in the second reading speech (or the speeches of any Government members in the Upper or Lower House) is it suggested that the legislative intention was to replace the objective test in s.99(3) with a wholly subjective one.

The new s.99(1)(b) is said to be modelled on s.365 of the Queensland Police Powers and Responsibilities Act. It might therefore be expected that guidance could be drawn from Queensland
authorities. However, there is a subtle but significant difference between the two provisions. The Queensland s365 commences as follows:

“It is lawful for a police officer, without warrant, to arrest an adult the police officer reasonably suspects has committed or is committing an offence if it is reasonably necessary for 1 or more of the following reasons”

This imposes an objective test (“arrest is reasonably necessary”), without a subjective element (as in “the police officer is satisfied that arrest is reasonably necessary”). Queensland authorities may therefore be of little assistance to NSW courts in interpreting the new s.99(1)(b).

**Additional reasons justifying arrest**

The factors listed in the old paras 99(3)(a)-(f) have been carried across, with minor amendments, and the following have been added:

(iii) To enable enquiries to be made to establish the person's identity if it cannot be readily established or if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that identity information provided is false

There is little doubt that this was already encompassed in the old section 99(3)(a) (now s99(1)(b)(iv)). This amendment does not appear to broaden the power in any way. Indeed, it could be said that it imposes more rigor on the police by imposing a duty to attempt to ascertain the person's identity before resorting to arrest.

(v) To obtain property in the possession of the person that is connected with the offence

It is difficult to see how this differs from the old s99(3)(c) (“to prevent the concealment, loss or destruction of evidence relating to the offence”) or the new s99(1)(b)(vi).

(ii) To stop the person fleeing from a police officer or from the location of the offence

This is partly subsumed in s99(1)(b)(iv) (formerly s99(3)(a)), “to ensure that the person appears before a court in relation to the offence”.

However, is arguably broader – a person may flee the scene, but be well-known to the police, easy to track down for the purpose of issuing a court attendance notice, and not a flight risk when it comes to attending court. The old s99(3)(a) would not have justified the arrest of such a person.

(vii) To protect the safety and welfare of any person (including the person arrested)

This has been broadened out to include persons other than the person being arrested. Some have suggested that this does not significantly broaden the power of police, as they already have a common law power of arrest to deal with a breach of the peace. However, “welfare” is a word capable of very broad interpretation; it is conceivable that police may arrest a person to protect another person’s welfare in situations where there is no imminent breach of the peace.

(ix) Because of the nature and seriousness of the offence

According to the Premier’s Second Reading Speech, “this gives police the certainty to act swiftly in the case of serious crimes without having to consider whether any other reason to arrest without a warrant exists”.

It was suggested during the parliamentary debate that arrest is appropriate for particular types of offences, such as domestic violence offences, because research has shown that “arresting domestic violence offenders deters future domestic violence from occurring”. In particular, the Premier was relying on a 2012 BOCSAR report entitled The effect of arrest and imprisonment on crime (http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/documents/pdf/cib158.pdf). It is respectfully suggested that the BOCSAR study was concerned with the deterrent effect of being apprehended, and not specifically of being placed under arrest. The BOCSAR report is not evidence for the proposition that being arrested is a greater deterrent to future offending than being served with a CAN.

In *Hage-Ali v State of New South Wales* [2009] NSWDC 266 (discussed above) it was held that, under the old s.99(3), it was impermissible to arrest a person based on stereotypes about particular types of offences or offenders. The recent insertion of s.99(1)(b)(ix) may have altered this position to some degree. However, even after this amendment, the arresting officer will still need to be
satisfied that arrest is reasonably necessary *in the particular circumstances*. The power to arrest is a discretionary one and there must be a meaningful exercise of that discretion. An officer who follows a blanket directive by their Local Area Commander to arrest all suspects for domestic violence offences (for example) would not be acting in accordance with s.99.

### 8 Power to arrest for breach of peace

LEPRA s.4 expressly preserves the powers conferred by the common law on police officers to deal with breaches of the peace.

Part 15 of LEPRA imposes obligations on police officers who are exercising common law powers of arrest.

#### 8.1 Definition of breach of the peace

“Breach of the peace” is not defined in LEPRA. The case law demonstrates that it can encompass a wide variety of situations, although it appears well-established that there must be a threat of violence (which may include the provocation of another person to violence).


> “[T]here is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance.”


However, in *Nicholson v Avon* [1991] 1 VR 212, it was held that a very noisy party, in the early hours of the morning, and incurring complaints from a neighbour, did amount to a breach of the peace. Marks J said (at 221), “In my opinion, there is no conduct more likely to promote violence than prolonged disturbance of the sleep of neighbours by noise and behaviour of the kind disclosed.”

#### 8.2 Power to deal with breach of the peace

At common law, police (and citizens) have extensive powers to prevent or to stop breaches of the peace. These include powers of entry, at least in some jurisdictions (*Nicholson v Avon* [1991] 1 VR 212, *Panos v Hayes* (1984) 44 SASR 148, and now enacted into s.9 of LEPRA), dispersing picketers (*Commissioner of Police (Tas); ex parte North Broken Hill Ltd* (1992) 61 A Crim R 390), confiscating items such as protesters' megaphones (*Minot v McKay (Police)* [1987] BCL 722) and arrest or detention (*Albert v Lavin* [1982] AC 546 at 565).

Lord Diplock said in *Albert v Lavin* (at 565):

> “[E]very citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking, or is threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate cases will include detaining him against his will.”

A person using such preventative powers must reasonably anticipate an imminent breach of the peace; it must be a real and not a remote possibility (*Piddington v Bates* [1961] 1 WLR 162; *Forbutt v Blake* (1981) 51 FLR 465).

Detention or arrest is a measure of last resort (*Innes v Weate* (1984) 12 A Crim R 45 at 52; *Commissioner of Police (Tas); ex parte North Broken Hill Ltd* (1992) 61 A Crim R 390).

The force used to restrain the citizen must only be such as is reasonable. The restraint may continue as long as is necessary to prevent the breach of the peace; the citizen must then be either released or arrested (presumably for a specific offence) (see *Albert v Lavin, Piddington v Bates*).
The case of *DPP v Armstrong* [2010] NSWSC 885 did not break any new ground but confirmed that police in NSW have a common law power to arrest for breach of the peace.

More recently, *Poidevin v Semaan* [2013] NSWCA 334 affirmed the broad power of police to take action to deal with a breach of the peace. At first instance, Rothman J sought to construe this power quite narrowly, but His Honour’s approach was rejected by the Court of Appeal.

9 Arrest for breach of bail

Under the repealed *Bail Act* 1978, s50 set out the actions that police could take in response to an actual or anticipated breach of bail. Although there was provision for an authorised justice to issue a summons or a warrant, this option was rarely used. Instead, it was the practice of police to arrest without warrant (and indeed, officers were often directed by their superiors to exercise no discretion).

Courts have been willing to find that an inappropriate exercise of discretion under s50 of the old Act renders an arrest improper. See, for example, *NT v R* [2010] NSWDC 348, which concerned a 14-year-old girl arrested at her own home for an alleged breach of a curfew condition the previous night.

This has been replaced by s.77 of the *Bail Act* 2013 (which commenced on 20 May 2014). Although some would say that s.77 falls short of providing that arrest for breach of bail is a last resort, it sets out a clear hierarchy of options and matters that the police officer must consider.

Section 77, in full, reads:

**77 Actions that may be taken to enforce bail requirements**

(1) A police officer who believes, on reasonable grounds, that a person has failed to comply with, or is about to fail to comply with, a bail acknowledgment or a bail condition, may:

(a) decide to take no action in respect of the failure or threatened failure, or
(b) issue a warning to the person, or
(c) issue a notice to the person (an "application notice") that requires the person to appear before a court or authorised justice, or
(d) issue a court attendance notice to the person (if the police officer believes the failure is an offence), or
(e) arrest the person, without warrant, and take the person as soon as practicable before a court or authorised justice, or
(f) apply to an authorised justice for a warrant to arrest the person.

(2) However, if a police officer arrests a person, without warrant, because of a failure or threatened failure to comply with a bail acknowledgment or a bail condition, the police officer may decide to discontinue the arrest and release the person (with or without issuing a warning or notice).

(3) The following matters are to be considered by a police officer in deciding whether to take action, and what action to take (but do not limit the matters that can be considered):

(a) the relative seriousness or triviality of the failure or threatened failure,
(b) whether the person has a reasonable excuse for the failure or threatened failure,
(c) the personal attributes and circumstances of the person, to the extent known to the police officer,
(d) whether an alternative course of action to arrest is appropriate in the circumstances.
(4) An authorised justice may, on application by a police officer under this section, issue a warrant to apprehend a person granted bail and bring the person before a court or authorised justice.

(5) If a warrant for the arrest of a person is issued under this Act or any other Act or law, a police officer must, despite subsection (1), deal with the person in accordance with the warrant.

Note: Section 101 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 gives power to a police officer to arrest a person in accordance with a warrant.

(6) The regulations may make further provision for application notices.

Whether an arrest that does not comply with s.77 is unlawful or merely improper will be a matter for the courts to decide. I would suggest that the use of the words "The following factors are to be considered" in subs(3) means that a police officer’s failure to consider any of these factors would render an arrest unlawful. An inappropriate exercise of the officer’s discretion (as opposed to a failure to exercise any discretion) would probably render the arrest improper.

10 Citizen’s arrest

10.1 Arrest for an offence

LEPRA s.100 provides that a person other than a police officer may arrest a person:

(a) in the act of committing an offence under any Act or statutory instrument;
(b) who has just committed any such offence; or
(c) who has committed a serious indictable offence for which he or she has not been tried.

A citizen does not have the power to arrest on suspicion. The person making the arrest must have witnessed the offence or be otherwise satisfied that the offence has been committed (Brown v G J Coles (1985) 59 ALR 455).

10.2 Arrest for breach of peace

It appears that a citizen also has a common law power to arrest for breach of the peace (see Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546 at 565). Although this power has not been expressly preserved by LEPRA s4 (which provides that LEPRA does not affect the common law powers of police to deal with a breach of the peace), nor has this power been expressly legislated away.

10.3 Safeguards

Although the safeguards in Part 15 do not apply to a citizen’s arrest, it appears clear from Christie v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567 that a person who is arrested by a private citizen is entitled to be told the reason why (unless of course it is obvious or the person arrested makes it impossible). Lord Du Parcq said (at 578):

“No citizen is bound to submit unresistingly to another citizen in ignorance of the charge made against him. For this reason a citizen cannot be charged for resistance as the right to arrest and the duty to submit are correlative”.

10.4 Use of force

As with police officers, citizens are empowered to use reasonable force to effect an arrest or to prevent the person’s escape (s.231).
10.5 Arrest as a last resort

In *DPP (NSW) v Mathews-Hunter [2014] NSWSC 843*, Fullerton J held that the principle of arrest as a last resort applies to the citizen’s arrest power in LEPRA s.100, at least where the power is being used by a person such as a transit officer who has other options available.

The defendant was travelling on a train when a transit officer observed him drawing on a window using a marker pen. The officer approached the defendant and immediately arrested him for malicious damage. It was alleged that the defendant then assaulted the officer. As well as being charged with offences under the *Graffiti Control Act*, he was charged with common assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

The assault matters were dismissed by the Local Court. The magistrate excluded the evidence of the alleged assault under s.138 of the *Evidence Act*, having found that the arrest was unlawful or improper.

The DPP appealed to the Supreme Court under s.56(1)(c) of the *Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act*. The DPP argued that there was a “critical distinction” between sections 99 and 100. Due to the absence of a s.99(1)(b) type provision in s.100, it was submitted that s.100 provided an unqualified power of arrest.

This submission was rejected by Fullerton J, who relied on the common law (and principally *DPP v Carr [2002] NSW SC 194*). After quoting from Smart AJ’s judgment in *Carr*, her Honour said:

49. In the present case the defendant was subjected to the additional punishment of being deprived of his liberty and being physically restrained for the commission of an offence that is punishable only by a fine, in circumstances where the arresting transit officer must be taken to have been aware that there were alternatives available to him even if he may not have been certain as to what they were.

50. Although Smart AJ was dealing with arrest powers under s 352 of the *Crimes Act* (since repealed), I note that the second reading speech to the Bill introducing LEPRA in 2002 makes it clear that the legislature intended that both ss 99 and 100 would be subject to the restrictions on the exercise of the power to arrest, including that arrest should be exercised only when necessary, and only as a last resort. In any event, s 352 did not displace the common law with regards to limitations on the power to arrest; neither did the enactment of ss 99 and 100 of LEPRA which replaced that provision (see *Zaravinos v State of NSW [2004] NSWCA 320; 62 NSWLR 58* per Bryson JA at [23]). In *Zaravinos*, at [23], Bryson JA observed that because of the high value the law places on personal liberty, "a statute which authorises the detention of a person must be strictly construed".

51. In *Williams v R [1986] HCA 88; 161 CLR 278*, Mason and Brennan JJ considered the "jealousy" with which the common law protects the right to personal liberty:

   The right to personal liberty is, as Fullagar J described it, "the most elementary and important of all common law rights": *Trobridge v Hardy*. Personal liberty was held by Blackstone to be an absolute right vested in the individual by the immutable laws of nature and had never been abridged by the laws of England "without sufficient cause" Commentaries on the Laws of England ... He warned:

   "Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper... there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities."

   That warning has been recently echoed. In *Cleland v The Queen* Deane J said:

   "It is of critical importance to the existence and protection of personal liberty under the law that the restraints which the law imposes on police powers of arrest and detention be scrupulously observed."
The right to personal liberty cannot be impaired or taken away without lawful authority and then only to the extent and for the time which the law prescribes.

52. Although his Honour did not say so expressly, it is implicit in his reasons that he was satisfied that the transit officer's decision to arrest the defendant was the result of either expediency or uncertainty as to how to respond in the circumstances, not, as the plaintiff submitted, because it was the appropriate response. Far from the power to arrest being executed as the last resort as is required at law, it was the transit officer's first response. There is no evidence to suggest that obtaining the defendant's details and passing them on to the police would not have been an effective way of dealing with the graffiti offences. In my view, in all the circumstances, the evidence supports his Honour's finding that the arrest was unlawful and improper.

Her Honour went on to hold that the magistrate did not err in excluding the evidence under s.138, and nor did his Honour err by failing to provide adequate reasons. The appeal was therefore dismissed in its entirety.

11 Information that must be provided under Part 15

11.1 Background

Part 15 of LEPRA requires police officers to provide information when exercising a range of powers. It was amended with effect from 1 November 2014.

Part 15 is partly based on the common law in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] 1 All ER 567, which requires police to tell the person the reason for the arrest, unless it is obvious (eg. the person is caught red-handed) or the person makes it impossible (eg. by fleeing or forcibly resisting). Christie v Leachinsky is still good law, although largely redundant for arrests to which Part 15 applies.

11.2 Recent amendments to Part 15 (as of 1 November 2014)

The Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment Act 2014 makes amendments which dilute the protection afforded by s201. Schedule 2 of the amendment Act, which commenced on 1 November 2014, repeals Part 15 of LEPRA and inserts a new Part 15.

The main amendments are:

(a) In respect of most powers, police must simply provide the required information as soon as reasonably practicable. However, the information must still be given before exercising a power that consists of a direction or request to a single person.

(b) In general, only one warning need be given when making a direction or request that a person is legally obliged to comply with (previously there was a two-stage warning required).

(c) A police officer's failure to provide their name and place of duty no longer renders the exercise of the power unlawful. However, the obligation of police to provide their name and place of duty is to be kept under scrutiny by the Ombudsman, who is to provide a report after a 12-month period.

(d) Any police officer present during the exercise of a power must provide their name and place of duty if asked.

11.3 Powers to which Part 15 applies

Part 15 applies to certain powers exercised by police officers. It also applies to special constables and other law enforcement officers (see Note to s.201), but not to private citizens.
Part 15 applies to powers listed in s.201(1), as long as they are not specifically excluded by s.210(3).

It applies to powers conferred by LEPRA as well as common law and other statutes, except the statutes listed in Schedule 1. Acts listed in Schedule 1 include the Bail Act, Mental Health Act, Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act, and the Road Transport Act, among others.

In an arrest context, Part 15 applies to arrests performed by police officers for an offence, on a warrant, or for breach of the peace. It does not apply to an arrest for breach of bail or to a citizen’s arrest.

11.4 Information that must be provided

Under s.202(1), a police officer is required to provide:

(a) evidence that he or she is a police officer (unless in uniform);
(b) his or her name and place of duty; and
(c) the reason for the exercise of the power.

11.5 Warnings that must be provided when exercising certain powers

If the power involves a direction, requirement or request that the person is legally obliged to comply with, the police officer must also warn the person of their obligation to comply (s.203(1)). However, a warning is not required if the person has already complied or is in the process of complying (s.203(2)). A person is not guilty of an offence of failing to comply unless a warning has been given (s.204B).

In the case of a direction given under s.198 (on the grounds that a person is intoxicated and disorderly in a public place), even if the person complies with the direction, the police must warn them that an offence to be intoxicated and disorderly in any public place within the next 6 hours (s.198(6)).

If two or more police officers are exercising the power, only one officer is required to provide the required information (and warning if applicable) (s.202(4) and s.203(4)). However, if the person asks a police officer present for their name and place of duty, the officer must provide this information s.202(5).

11.6 Time at which information and warning must be provided

If police are giving a direction, requirement or request to a single person, the information in s.202(1) must be provided before giving the direction, requirement or request (s.202(2)(b)).

In all other cases, the information must be given as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so (s.202(2)(a)).

The warnings required by s.203 must be given as soon as reasonably practicable after the direction, requirement or request (s.203(3)).

11.7 Effect of non-compliance with Part 15

Although somewhat diluted by the 2014 amendments, the provisions of Part 15 (with one exception) are still mandatory.

Non-compliance with the requirement to provide:

- evidence that the officer is a police officer; or
- the reason for the exercise of the power

will take an officer outside the lawful execution of his or duty.
The new s.204A provides that an officer’s failure to provide their name and/or place of duty does not render the exercise of the power unlawful or otherwise effect the validity of anything resulting from the exercise of that power, except:

- if the power consists of a direction, requirement or request to a single person; or
- if the officer was asked for their name or place of duty.

11.8 Case law on Part 15

Before the 2014 amendments, the obligations under Part 15 were all contained in s.201. The obligation to comply with s.201, and the implications of not complying with it as soon as reasonably practicable, were examined by Rothman J in Semaan v Poidevin [2013] NSWSC 226.

His Honour held that, in situations where the section allows the police to comply as soon as reasonably practicable after exercising the power, failure to comply with s.201 as soon as reasonably practicable retrospectively affects the lawfulness of the police officer’s conduct.

However, this was overturned by the Court of Appeal in Poidevin v Semaan [2013] NSWCA 334. The lead judgment was delivered by Leeming JA (with whom Ward JA and Emmett JA agreed).

It was held that a failure to comply with s.201 when it becomes practicable does not retrospectively render the police officer’s actions unlawful (see paras 16-28).

Further, it is not necessary for the officer exercising the power to consider whether or not it is practicable to comply with s.201: “The question of compliance with the duty imposed by s201(1) turns upon an objective fact, namely, whether or not it is practicable to comply before or at the time of exercising the power.” (at para 28).

Non-compliance with Part 15 at a time when compliance is reasonably practicable would still take an officer outside the lawful execution of their duty.

For an example of a civil case, post-Poidevin v Semaan, in which an arrest was held to be unlawful because the police did not tell the plaintiff the true reason for her arrest and thus did not comply with s.201, see State of New South Wales v Abed [2014] NSWCA 419 (at paras 85-107).

Another civil case is Hamilton v State of NSW (No 13) [2016] NSWSC 1311, in which the arrest complied with s.99 but was held to be unlawful because police did not comply with Part 15 as soon as practicable.

12 Use of force

LEPRA s.231 empowers police to use “such force as is reasonably necessary” to make an arrest or to prevent the person’s escape.

The law does not appear to be settled as to whether excessive force makes an arrest unlawful per se (see, for example, article by Dan Meagher: Excessive force used in making an arrest: does it make the arrest ipso facto unlawful?, (2004) 28 Crim LJ 237).

However, there is no doubt that an officer who uses excessive force to make an arrest is acting outside the lawful execution of his or her duty.

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Updated February 2017